One of the most promising areas in Catholic schools is virtue education. Programs such as Virtues in Practice created by the Nashville Dominicans are currently in use in schools across North America, while major universities have recently dedicated centers to virtue-related scholarship, such as the Jubilee Center at the University of Birmingham, UK, and the Center for Practical Wisdom at the University of Chicago. Virtue education programs attempt to restore ancient wisdom from the tradition of Plato and Aristotle to modern pedagogy. For these programs to succeed, virtue must be seen not as mere content to be mastered, but as participatory knowledge of God to embody, which shapes both the end and means of education. This vision of virtue education rooted in Aquinas and continued through to modern thinkers such as Simone Weil, John Verveake, and Hans urs von Balthasar, grounds propositional knowledge about virtue in the cultivation of character and attention through virtue as the primary goal of learning. 

Two works of Aquinas pertinent to education are his inaugural lecture Rigans Montes (1998), and Question 11 of Disputed Questions on Truth (1953). Both texts describe education as a process where the teacher cultivates the natural potency for truth that God actively forms in the pupil. Thomas gives us a helpful analogy for the role of the teacher in Rigans Montes, interpreting Psalm 103, where he compares the teacher to a mountain, which communicates the waters of divine wisdom from the heavens, down to the soil of the student (Aquinas, 1998, Section 2). The teacher participates in the enlightening activity of God in the mind, which acts as the medium by which the living waters of wisdom can nourish the soil of the student. The art of teaching does not consist in being a “good mountain” alone; it also involves cultivating the soil of the student to receive the waters of wisdom well, which, among other things, will require cultivating the virtue of humility (Aquinas, 1998, Section 3). 

In Q. 11 of the Disputed Questions on Truth, Thomas describes the acquiring of knowledge through a teacher in terms of activating a natural potential of the soul, similar to what medicine can do for the body. “Knowledge, therefore, pre-exists in the learner potentially, not, however, in the purely passive, but in the active, sense…when someone else aids the learner’s natural reason, and this is called learning by instruction” (Aquinas, 1953, Q.11 A.1). The process of education is such that the teacher uses language as an instrument to lead a student from things known to the discovery of things unknown. In fact, Thomas argues that the act of learning has the structure of a syllogism. However, the major premise is not a proposition itself but is the natural potential for knowledge inherent in the pupil, that is, the natural potential to participate in Truth: “Consequently, one person is said to teach another inasmuch as, by signs, he manifests to that other the reasoning process which he himself goes through by his own natural reason. And thus, through the instrumentality, as it were, of what is told to him, the natural reason of the pupil arrives at a knowledge of the things which he did not know” (Aquinas, 1953, Q.11, A.1) Ultimately, Thomas argues that God is the ultimate teacher in the interior of the intellect, given that all learning is a possibility of the natural light of reason, which is a participated likeness in God himself (Aquinas, 1953, Q. 11, A.1).

These two sources suggest that education transcends mere mastery of content; it is about the perfection of a student's intellect and its potential to know its Creator through participation, a knowledge we might term wisdom. Such a view of education would consider itself a failure if a student were to perform well in a specific subject without forming a deeper participation of the mind in the source of truth. For example, a theology teacher might experience students who learn statements of doctrine for a test but who fail to see how these truths are relevant to them and their lives. A Thomistic view of education would not consider itself successful unless it has facilitated a transformation within the character of the student, disposing him/her to receive the truths taught in class. Ultimately, the achievement of such an education would be the formation of a wise character which transcends mastery of specific subject matter, where a student can live out his or her adult life with the proper formation of their character to live wisely, “ordering things rightly” towards achieving union with God. For an educator to cultivate the student’s participation in Truth, the primary task will be in cultivating the attention of students. This can be described by synthesizing Aquinas on virtue, with the 20th century philosopher and mystic Simone Weil, who wrote specifically on the role of attention in studies. 

As mentioned in Rigans Montes, the “soil” of a student has to be properly disposed if he or she is to recognize a truth communicated through language (Aquinas 1998). Thus, merely perfecting the art of speaking well and managing a class-room are not enough. Teachers must develop certain habits which provoke a transformation within the student. The habits which transform the character of a student are of course the virtues, which Thomas classified into the intellectual virtues needed to know the truth, and the moral virtues needed to pursue the good (Aquinas, 2010, p. 78). The moral virtues, (prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude), are often well-known. Thomas identifies the intellectual virtues as knowledge, understanding, prudence, craft, and wisdom (Aquinas, 2010, p. 79). The important thing to remember is that when Aquinas uses words like “knowledge” or “understanding,” he is not talking about mere artifacts or events of understanding, but habits which facilitate learning, giving the movements of the mind towards truth stability, readiness, and pleasure (Aquinas, 2010, p. 4-5). 

Thus, virtue education is primarily a process which students participate in through the guidance of their teacher. To reduce virtue education to the mere subject matter among other subjects in a curriculum would miss the entire point. While teaching the virtues will of course involve defining them in language, to properly form these habits in students requires that the educative efforts themselves (e.g. class activities, assessments, and objectives) are designed with the intention of forming these habits. 

Writing in a more mystical tone, Simone Weil describes education in a way which correlates to Aquinas. For Weil, the value of studies is not primarily in gaining a body of knowledge, but in cultivating the power of attention for the purpose of prayer (Weil, 1951, p. 61-620). She identifies the path to achieving well-formed attention as virtue, most notably humility, which is precisely the virtue mentioned by Thomas in Rigans Montes. “In the intellectual order, the virtue of humility is nothing more nor less than the power of attention” (Weil, 1952, p. 182). That being said, this virtuous attention is not one characterized by “muscular effort,” but by an acquired receptivity to truth which has its ultimate fruit in the student’s greater partaking in love of God and neighbor (Weil, 1952, p. 67-69). In this view, the goal of education is once again seen as participatory: a gifted student could become very proficient in “learning” but have failed in the true purpose of education, while a student who struggles with academics could nevertheless be using their studies wisely to form their attention well. 

Weil is very clear that the attention is formed not in vague exercises apart from the typical school subjects, but precisely through approaching each specific lesson, such as a geometry problem or a translation, as an opportunity to form virtue, especially the virtue of humility. In fact, every school exercise is “like a sacrament” (Weil, 1952, p. 68) when it is done with the formal motive of partaking in the life of God, who is Truth: “The solution of a geometry problem does not in itself constitute a precious gift, but the same law applies to it because it is the image of something precious. Being a little fragment of particular truth, it is a pure image of the unique, eternal, and living truth, the very Truth which once in a human voice declared ‘I Am the Truth.’ “ (Weil, 1952, p. 67) 

An analogy for the way virtue forms attention is “The Process” coined by legendary football coach Nick Saban, who won 40% of national titles in a span of two decades (Duffy, 2022). Saban’s goal in coaching is similar to the goal of teaching described by Thomas: to maximize the natural potential within an athlete, using the specific tasks of the game of football to form their general character to “the best it can be” (Saban, 2005, p. 23). Saban’s “Process” prioritizes the building of habits over external success, even making the radical claim that players should not look at the scoreboard, but instead focus on what is demanded of them each play (Duffy, 2022). This is similar to the way both Aquinas and Weil describe education: the focus is on using the propositional subject matter of teaching to form a student’s character in a way that transcends the mere learning and assessment of material; it is process -- or character --oriented. No sane person would think that the propositional “Xs and Os” instructed by Saban were the extent of coaching football. The on-field practices, in-game adjustments, and the actual performance of the plays is of course “the real thing.” This is paradigmatic for the way a Thomistic education views the relation between content and acquired habits in the classroom. Often activities seen as mere “application” should be seen as the real thing itself. 

Approaching education as the formation of attention through virtue is also consistent with some of the most current theories of knowledge in cognitive science, epitomized by John Vervaeke at the University of Toronto. Vervaeke has constructed a four-fold theory of knowledge, which offers clarifying vocabulary of what a “participatory approach” to education might look like (Vervaeke, 2024, p. 29). Vervaeke aims to show that propositional knowledge is only a small fraction of the total amount of knowledge gained in a human life. In addition to propositional knowledge of principles, there is procedural knowledge, which is the ability to do or perform something; perspectival knowledge, which is the experience of some state; and participatory knowledge, which is gained through identifying with another or with one’s community (Vervaeke, 2024, p. 29). To illustrate, consider teaching the virtue of courage to a class. Defining the virtue of courage and giving examples would be propositional knowledge. Coaching the students through actual performance of this virtue in a real scenario would be procedural knowledge. The ensuing experience of what it’s like to be courageous would be perspectival knowledge. (This might also be gained by having students identify with the experience of a fictional character in a book or movie). Participatory knowledge would be the student identifying with this aspect of the virtuous life embodied by others. Thus, the non-propositional domains of procedures and perspectives are necessary for the education to result in a student actually living and embodying the knowledge captured in propositions. 

Vervaeke orients education in a way consistent with both Aquinas and Weil: learning transcends the acquisition of propositions, but is directed ultimately to wisdom, which he defines as a “cognitive style” which allows us to engage in the relevance realization needed to flourish (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 13). Relevance realization refers to the mind processing through the superabundance of information in an environment. There is too much information at any given moment, thus we engage in relevance realization, a self-organizing process by which the mind views the world through a “frame,” directing attention to certain information as valuable (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 9). This means that what a student sees as credible or valuable in a class will depend on the frame in which they view it. For example, a student of theology will likely not see a religious claim as credible if they do not see it as relevant to their particular life. As Vervaeke says,“Relevance realization is simultaneously attentional, affective, and motivational. Relevance realization largely concerns how you care about and for information” (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 9). Developing relevance realization which leads us towards recognition of the right things as valuable, wisdom, involves the integration of propositional knowledge with the non-propositional domains of procedure and perspective (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 9-13). Thus, education should take an active part in the relevance realization of students, not only seeking to transmit a body of propositions, but also working to perfect the student’s frame of mind, so the information can be approached and received well. 

I would suggest that the formation of attention through virtue delineated by Aquinas and Weil is at least similar to what Vervaeke describes as wise relevance realization. For example, Vervaeke describes the formation of procedural and perspectival knowledge in terms amenable to Aquinas’ theory of virtue. “Wisdom involves the cultivation of character, which is a procedural system more comprehensive than expertise and that is intricately integrated with perspectival knowledge of what it is like to be self leading a good life” (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 9). In fact, when Vervaeke describes the specific processes the mind engages in when framing, he uses language very similar to the intellectual virtues identified by Thomas. Instead of the term understanding (the finding of a genus which connects species), Vervaeke uses the term co-relevance. This would be the habit of recognizing the relations between different bits of information. In place of the Thomistic term knowledge (the acquisition of a relevant principle), Vervaeke uses the term importance to indicate the habit of recognizing meaningful information (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 7). Vervaeke also indicates that virtues are the conditions for wisdom, which govern our relevance realization towards knowing and doing what is essential to participate in the good life (Vervaeke, 2024, p. 130). It is not only intellectual virtue, but also moral virtue which is needed to engage in the world in a wise way. For example, a temperate person will have a very different picture of what is important than a hedonist regarding opportunities for sensual pleasure. Education influenced by Aquinas and Vervaeke would consider shaping relevance realization through virtue an essential part of the teacher’s responsibility. 

Ultimately, Vervaeke describes wisdom and its pursuit in terms similar to Aquinas, and with the same term used by Saban in our example: as a process of integrating propositions, procedures, and perspectives (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p.2). This process is a participatory one in at least two aspects. First, wisdom is participatory insofar as it offers us a meaningful and relevant place in relationship to others (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 7). Second, wisdom is participatory since it usually involves internalizing the perspective of “the sage” (a wise person) in a first-person sharing of view (Vervaeke and Ferraro, 2013, p. 20). Unfortunately, Vervaeke’s secular reasoning limits his understanding of participation to the social and ethical level. In the future, theologians wishing to ground the journey towards truth in transcendence beyond the interpersonal will need to stay true to Aquinas’ insistence that the intellect, which makes all learning possible, is a sharing in the light of God. 

One promising area of future collaboration between students of Thomas and more contemporary theology is the writing of Hans urs von Balthasar, especially his work on how the human soul perceives revelation. Balthasar is a very complex thinker and is unfortunately enmeshed in the questionable rivalry of “Thomists vs Communio” which still lingers to this day. Thus, only a potential starting point for future scholarship will be suggested. Balthasar did not write much about virtue or education, but one of the most pressing concerns across his major works is that the credibility of Christian truth can only be seen by someone already participating in the Christian life. In fact, Balthasar follows Thomas in viewing the intellect and its activity as a participation in the light of God. “It is the light of Being that enables us to know all existents, though we never behold Being itself as an object; at the same time, however, we do behold Being in everything existent, since anything we know can be known only in the light of Being and from the viewpoint of Being” (Balthasar, 1982, p. 159). This insight is foundational for Balthasar’s famous concern with the “aesthetic” quality of revelation: meaning, God reveals himself to man not as a proposition which needs to be verified by other facts, but as a form which is also its own evidence (Balthasar, 1982, p. 168). 

This idea of “seeing the form” is also potential common ground with the attempts to describe the participatory nature of truth outlined above. For example, Baltahsar cautions against the Enlightenment tendency to view Christ as one truth among others, instead insisting that the form of revelation provides its own credibility in the way the very form of a piece of art or music conditions the recipient to receive its content (Balthasar, 2004, p. 56). Bishop Robert Barron recently compared this on the Word on Fire podcast to a famous anecdote of Beethoven, who after playing one of his new compositions on the piano, was asked to verbalize what it means. He promptly sat back down to the piano and played it again (Barron 2024). The meaning is only seen from within. As Balthasar puts it, “God can only be known by God…But in man’s own turning to Christ what shines forth is not man’s own aptitude for faith, but rather Christ’s aptitude to give to the inept a share in his own light and power” (Balthasar, 1982, p. 174-175). 

To summarize, a Thomistic approach to education would characterize a process in which the teacher guides students to participate in God by analogy, through the curriculum and classroom activities. The primary fruit of this process would be cultivating a student’s attention through the virtues, which organize our intellect to be well disposed to truth. Such an approach is consistent with the work of other more recent thinkers, such as the philosopher Simone Weil and the psychologist John Vervaeke, and might play a pivotal part in unpacking the giants of 20th century theology in years to come. 

Works Referenced 

Aquinas, Thomas. (2010). Disputed Questions on Virtue, trans. Jeffrey Hause and Claudia Eisen Murphy. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 

Aquinas, Thomas. (1953). Disputed Questions on Truth, trans.James McGlynn (1953) ed.by Aquinas Institute. Aquinas Institute 

Aquinas, Thomas. (1998). Inaugural Lectures “Rigans Montes,” trans. Ralph McInernry/ Penguin. 

Duffy, Ryan. (2022). How Champions Think: “Coach Nick Saban and The Process Thinking Mental Model.” Medium. 

Saban, Nick. (2005). How Good Do You Want to Be: A Champion’s Tips on How to Succeed at Work and Life. Ballantine Books. 

Vervaeke, John. (2024). Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. Story Grid Publishing. 

Vervaeke, John and Ferraro, Leo. (2013). “Relevance, Meaning, and the Cognitive Science of Wisdom.” Research Gate. 

Von Balthasar, Hans urs. (2004). Love Alone is Credible, Trans. D.C. Schindler. Ignatius Press. 

Von Balthasar, Hans urs. (1982). The Glory of the Lord, Vol. 1. Trans. By Erasmo, Leiva-Merikakis. Ed. Fessio, Joseph and Richies, John. Ignatius Press. 

Weil, Simone. (1952). Gravity and Grace, trans. By Arthur Wills. G.T. Putnam’s. 

Weil, Simone (1951). Waiting for God. “Reflections on the right use of school studies with a view to God.” Routledge.