It is often said that “our world is more connected than ever.” This is a deceitful (though not always malicious) aphorism. Although our world is certainly “connected” through the mass media of, say, social media and international news outlets, it is perhaps more fitting to say that the world is more “on-display” than ever. Several internet browsers open by default to international headlines. Meanwhile, people are more frequently disconnected from their families, peer groups, and other communities. Students -- including those who attend in-person schools and participate in extracurricular activities -- are still expressing feelings of loneliness. Some would like to scapegoat social media as the sole culprit of loneliness and wipe their hands of the matter; however, social media is only another catalyst (albeit a large one) that contributes to loneliness. There is a deeper, more heart wrenching root: many people, old and young, do not know how to form and sustain meaningful friendships. 

            In Catholic and classical education settings, it is imperative that students know what friendships ought to be, see friendships modeled between their teachers and coaches, and are provided the space for friendships to flourish. This paper primarily focuses on the Aristotelian-Thomistic vision of friendship—what it is for, how it is formed, and what it looks like. After defining a “good” friendship, it examines how a Catholic, classical teacher might foster friendship within the classroom and the school building more broadly. 

Friendship as a Virtue

            In the eighth and ninth books of The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle examines friendship. Before Aristotle offers an essential definition of friendship, he calls it a virtue, and this is no arbitrary classification. In The Nicomachean Ethics, he describes virtue as a hexis—a state, condition, or disposition, distinct from an emotion or capacity.^[1] He defines dispositions as “conditions in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the feelings concerned.”^[2] A temperate man, for instance, is disposed through habit to do temperate -- rather than intemperate -- acts in spite of his changing moods. These virtues cannot be called emotions, the Philosopher notes, for men are neither called good nor bad for their feelings, but they are called “good” according to their virtue and “bad” according to their vice. Emotions are not chosen, but dispositions are chosen; virtues are “expressions of our choice.”^[3] Likewise, capacities (faculties) are not a matter of choice but of nature; neither a virtue nor vice are said of man by nature but by his act. It is by these proofs that Aristotle concludes that virtues are dispositions, which enables him to attribute free choice to friendship. 

            It is not simply choice that renders friendship a virtue, as the Philosopher opens book eight with the claim that friendship is “a kind of virtue, or implies virtue, and it is also most necessary for living.”^[4] As a virtue, friendship is both of necessity and good for human flourishing; Aristotle’s determination of friendship as ordered to the good and most necessary elevates the typically mundane discourse surrounding human relationships, drawing it into the transcendent space contributing to eudaimonia. For the Philosopher, friendship is not simply a better option within elective choice, as whether to eat breakfast on a particular morning, but it is also necessary. He notes that “nobody would choose to live without friends even if he had all other good things,”^[5] but he also makes it clear that all men actually need to have friends. The wealthy man both desires and needs friends, both to enjoy the goods which he has^[6] and for the preservation of his goods. The young need friends to restrain from sin, the elderly require care for their infirmities, and the able-bodied need friends to perform good acts. 

            Regardless of their priority with respect to one another, both affection and need are present in most human relationships. The Philosopher’s opening lines of his Politics explicitly address the notion that man is necessarily political (or relational). Man’s insufficiency renders him necessarily dependent upon a community to secure basic goods. Thomas Aquinas aptly recognizes the inherent goodness in man’s interconnectedness, offering that, “when two work together, they are more effective. This is true in both rational investigation where one sees what the other cannot see and external activity in which one is especially a help to the other.”^[7] Two are able to serve another more fully than if they were alone, and man cannot stand on his own; he needs another, and most often many others, to secure a happy life. The same is said of political relations, where the legislator not only needs the citizen to legislate over, but he also needs friendship between citizens, as harmony begets and preserves justice.^[8]

            But as man is inclined by necessity toward others, he is also drawn into relationship beyond the character of utility. Aristotle offers additional proofs for the emergence of natural friendships, indicating how these utilitarian friendships may produce true affection. Among these are the natural bond between a parent and child, which Aristotle calls friendship.^[9] Yet the Philosopher recognizes that this bond is not exclusive to human families but extends often to animal parent and offspring; thus, he deduces that affection is produced within the bond of biological relation. Particular to the human species, on the other hand, is the affinity he feels toward those with whom he shares customs or activity; one hardly witnesses an argument between persons cheering for the same team in a sporting match or engaging together in religious worship. Still yet more human, Aristotle says, is the friendly affection between strangers—only man seems to be naturally philanthropic, serving an unknown member of his same species.^[10]

            Aristotle understands that friendships are not simply necessary; they are also good. For men, through their friends, are encouraged in virtue—the way of happiness. Friends are a help in practical matters, but they also enable the happy, or virtuous life, to thrive in community. Daniel Schwartz writes in Aquinas on Friendship that, “The happy life demands the permanent availability of the resources which allow virtuous operation. Friendship is said to be one such resource; without friends the continuity of virtuous operation would be impaired; one would be likely to lose enthusiasm for and interest in the activity of virtuous living.”^[11] Friends help one another to exercise the virtues; it is through the intentional communities of friends that a man is able to exercise virtue freely and is encouraged to persevere in goodness. Without friends, a community will fail, as no stable or healthy community can grow without the bonds of mutual affection between persons. Aristotle will go so far to say that friendship between members of community eliminates faction, because between friends there is no need for justice, as justice is a quality of friendship. Concord between communities enables those within them to live peaceably and thus, friendship is ordered to the common good.^[12] Friendship is good both for the individual and in common.   

The Essential Definition of Friendship in Aristotle

            Aristotle offers a three-part definition of friendship in the eighth chapter of The Ethics. Friends must be well-disposed towards each other. Without mutual affection, a relationship between persons cannot be called a friendship. Thomas says that if one wishes good for another, and this good is not reciprocated, then the man is benevolent, not a friend. The one loved must be changed by the one loving, “for friendship has a kind of exchange of love after the manner of commutative justice."^[13] Moreover, Aristotle proposes the condition that the mutual affection must be recognized. That is, one cannot be called a friend to one whom he does not know. A man can be benevolent toward those not known to him, but friendship is contingent upon recognition. This consideration of friendship is more exclusive—a man can be a philanthropist or benefactor without being called a friend.^[14] Finally, friends must also wish the good for each other for the sake of one of three reasons: utility, pleasure, or the good. “Men wish good to friends for their sake, not from passion, but from habit.”^[15] Aristotle admits that these three criterion: mutual affection, recognition, and friendship for the sake of another good are prerequisites for determining a relationship “friendship.”

            With this foundation, the Philosopher puts forth three kinds of friendship, which take for their objects three different kinds of affection: useful, the pleasurable, and the good as such, which “do not differ in kind as three equal species of a genus but are classified by priority and posteriority.”^[16] That is, they are classified by the perfection of friendship within them. These three objects, when in the agent, form three friendships: those of utility, pleasure, and goodness. While each friendship is characterized by a kind of affection, useful and pleasurable friendships are characterized by affection not for the individual, but for an object, quality, or service. 

            Useful friendships are formed of circumstance. Aristotle says these friendships are formed on a common ground and that once this ground is broken, the friendships easily break. These are impermanent because the affection held within the friendship does not reside in the other, but in the exchange between them. Thomas says that “of those who love one another for the sake of utility, one does not love the other for the sake of the other, but inasmuch as he receives from the other some good for himself.”^[17] The useful friend is a means to an end; no greater relation would exist without that end, without the transactional encounter between them. In fact, Aristotle claims that within a utilitarian friendship, “Such persons do not spend much time together, because sometimes they do not even like one another.”^[18] This friendship is thus characterized not by particular affection, but mutual need. By extension, this need enables useful friendships to qualify as friendships. 

            Pleasurable friendships are likewise impermanent not because the friends are receiving a service from the other, but because the friends find one another pleasant. One is the friend who is pleasant to spend time with, and the other is delighted by his witty remarks, his gall, or his intellect. These friendships, although perhaps seeming more noble than the friendship of utility, are self-serving, as one receives pleasure not from the other for himself, but for what is incidental to him.^[19] The friend takes pleasure in a quality, not a person. Young people, Aristotle says, are susceptible to such kinds of friendships “because they live according to the passions and follow what is pleasing to them at that moment … [and] they love on account of passion and pleasure.”^[20] Thomas is quick to identify the weakness of the young person’s rational judgment, by which the passions must be regulated—yet, the angelic doctor is optimistic as he identifies how these friendships “readily change,” and often become more perfect with age.^[21] More often than not, those friendships once based in pleasure reach a breaking point and those which endure obtain higher goods for their object.  

            On the other hand, the perfect friendship is for the good of virtue. The persons involved in perfect friendship are themselves good, and “each alike wish good for the other qua good.”^[22] This certainly satisfies the essential definition of friendship that the Philosopher offers. In these friendships, the individuals are useful to each other and pleasing to each other, as they are good; what is good absolutely contains within it these lower goods. Aristotle quickly notes that these friendships are rare for several reasons: first, because good men are rare. Second, because such friendships require time and intimacy. Third, good friendships require proof of fidelity.^[23] If these three are fulfilled, there are certain benefits to the friendship, most especially duration and quality. Aristotle says these friendships are those that endure so long as the persons within them remain good. Goodness only begets goodness, whereas one might not allow the fruit of friendship to show forth if he were to exhibit wickedness, so corrupting the good of the friendship and lowering it either to be called a friendship or utility or pleasure, or no friendship at all. 

Good Friendships in Catholic Schools

            That friendship is a virtue ought not to be surprising for the Catholic; in the garden, man was made in friendship with his wife. Our Incarnate Lord gathers together his own community of friends in the Twelve. The Church itself is a community of persons to whom God sent the Spirit. Each step of salvation history involves a community of friends walking with Christ, even unto communion of saints. But the exercise of this virtue, in light of workplace “politics” and “cliques”, as well as the exhausting nature of the educator’s task, becomes more difficult. Within a Catholic school, teachers have no option but to model virtuous friendship between colleagues, so as to model Christ. That is, teachers have to exemplify friendship that seeks the highest good— glorifying Christ through the call of Catholic education. This is only made possible under the condition that all educational staff regard themselves not simply as colleagues, but as laborers in Christ’s vineyard, entrusted with a divine mission. In doing so, educators and administrators foster and exhibit an environment of mutual support and friendship in light of the Gospel call to holiness. 

            The burdens of educational ministry are many and varied, and demands through the year can cause any teacher a disharmonious soul, especially in times of spiritual desolation. The rift within the individual soul becomes a chasm when educators foster disunion among themselves. Gossip, anger, and withholding forgiveness undermine the mission which Christ set educators to complete. But Catholics, in particular, are given a straightforward solution to strife. In the case that such sins abound among friends within an educational staff, the resolution is reconciliation. The model of returning to Christ, admitting one’s faults, and resolving to sin no more, and the subsequent acting to atone for one’s poor decisions, allows for peace and forgiveness to prosper. To follow this model is not only important, but requisite to the Catholic school environment.  Teachers cannot successfully invite students to live out the Gospel with their peers if they themselves cannot, as adults, peaceably and respectfully labor with their own colleagues. Animosity among colleagues produces disharmony in the school. Children have to be invited to Christ in an authentic community of followers and friends of Christ; they are too perceptive, too observant, to be deceived. What we give them is what they will choose to take or leave—and we hope to give them Christ. 

            To be sure, this task of building good friendships and living out the virtue of friendship in the modern world is great. As Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas remind us, friendship is both necessary for communities and difficult to live out properly. As our daily experiences remind us, we and our colleagues are sinful creatures who have to constantly return to the father for mercy. By understanding what friendship consists in, striving to attain it among his peers, and being quick to mercy with those who frustrate him, the Catholic educator can live out virtuous friendship in his school. When this becomes tenuous, he remembers to rest in Christ, for his yoke is easy and his burden is light (Mt. 11:28-30). It is requisite that the educator foster an atmosphere of authentic, Christ-centered friendship for the social integrity and spiritual well-being of the school. Just as we cannot expect students to come to Christ if they are taught about a false Christ, so too we cannot expect children to form true friendships if they witness false friendships. If we are to be models of the Gospel, we must remember that we are called to be friends to one another, that we might also be friends of Christ.